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On March 11th, 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared the emerging
COVID-19 threat a pandemic following the global spread of the virus. As countries around
the world implemented emergency measures in a concerted effort to handle the emerging
pandemic, the nature and implications of the different kinds of precautionary measures
adopted have remained contested. The majority of countries opted for efforts to slow the
rate of infection, whilst critics have argued for stricter and milder measures, respectively.
The living experience of the pandemic is inherently temporal as it is shaped by sentiments
of living in anticipation of the envisioned pandemic peak(s) and aftermath, as vividly
illustrated with references to the need for ‘flattening the curve’ so as to reduce the impact of
the looming or creeping crisis. This paper sets out to critically discuss the notion of
pandemic ‘strategies’, recognizing also that governments altered their strategic stances
throughout the initial phase of the pandemic. It is likely that the aftermath of the crisis will
trigger discussions of what kind of response should be considered as best practice. Thus,
greater attention to the notion of ‘strategies’ in light of the COVID-19 pandemic is in order.
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The outbreak of a novel type of coronavirus labeled SARS-CoV-2 gave rise to the
declaration of a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) on
January 30th, 2020. On March 11, 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO)
declared a pandemic status for the outbreak, having observed that the outbreak was
now of a global scale (WHO 2020). Having originated as a ‘pneumonia of un-
certain cause’ in the city of Wuhan in the Chinese province of Hubei, the viral
disease COVID-19 eventually spread to every corner of the world. As countries
around the world implemented emergency measures in a concerted effort to
manage the emerging pandemic, the nature and implications of the different
precautionary measures adopted are increasingly contested. Many countries opted
for efforts to halt the reproduction of the disease, whilst critics have argued
for stricter and milder measures, respectively. In any case, it is clear that the
management of creeping crises poses distinct challenges (Boin et al. 2020a, 2021).
Affect, in turn, shaped by cultural lenses and prevailing political constellations,
as well as how crises are narratively constructed, results in great variation
in responses and interpretations of the unfolding course of events (Brown 2020).
It is in many ways precisely this sense of the COVID-19 pandemic ‘unfolding
before our very eyes’ that also generates this intense sense of bracing for the
worst, the next peak, holding our breath to see if the curve will ‘flatten’, producing
socio-cultural effects ranging from the individual to the societal and global level
(Werron and Ringel 2020).
This paper is inspired by public debates that often featured in the global media
in the first year of the COVID-19 pandemic which centered on what kinds of
strategic stances should be pursued, and particularly how countries (claimed to)
‘shift’ from one ‘approach’ to another in response to ‘emerging insights’. The
United Kingdom (UK), for example, was quick to abandon a strategy centered on
shielding mainly the elderly. South Korea was praised for its test-trace-and-isolate
(TTI) strategy. Norway shifted from first pursuing a strategy emphasizing that the
population should limit contact and work from home so as to protect at-risk
populations, before eventually debating whether to pursue a ‘slow down’ or a ‘beat
down’ strategy, presenting it as a critical conjuncture for the country (Government
of Norway 2020a). In debates surrounding whether to opt for a ‘slow the spread’
rationale or a more ambitious goal, the Government of Norway concluded that
slowing the spread was not enough and the country hence went for a ‘beat down’
strategy, which was later replaced by a long-term response more akin to a ‘slow the
spread’ strategy, also relying on TTI with the purpose of ‘keeping infections under



























































































‘zero tolerance’ strategies, albeit also having had to face criticism for the adverse
consequences this strategic choice has had for people and families dependent on
travel. Australia, for instance, have faced criticism for not facilitating the safe
return of its citizens (BBC 2021). All over the world, we have since witnessed, on
one hand, sets of narratives concerning the presentation of strategy, and on the
other hand discussions focused on what concrete non-pharmaceutical interventions
(NPIs) the strategy should consist of, accompanied by normative discussions on
how much freedoms could desirably or legally be limited and how to draw the
line between safety concerns, rights and liberal values (Hale et al. 2020; Capano
et al. 2020; Boin et al. 2021). In the second year of the pandemic, in 2021, the
strategic stance has shifted to one focused on vaccines, which in turn has given rise
to optimistic strategic stances centered on quickly reopening and other ones cen-
tered on more careful and less optimistic approaches. In this context, an ‘eradi-
cationist’ narrative can be observed on one end, and a normalization narrative on
the other end.
Reflecting on the kinds of responses taken, their nature and their potential
implications are therefore necessary, not only for informative reasons, but also
because discussions on what kind of approaches will set precedence is likely to be
a highly contested process. The stakes are high as hard-won liberties are in some
contexts set aside in favor of militarized or ‘draconian’ responses (Kalkman 2020;
Boin et al. 2021). In broad strokes, kinds of responses may be meaningfully
grouped into five broad categories of interventions that different countries have
implemented and indeed shifted between depending on changes in the political
climate as well as new data. This typological discussion is intended to inform
conceptual advances in the wake of the pandemic as well as to serve as a useful
analytical tool in a policy research context.
Some countries, for various reasons, implemented what we may label ‘laissez-
faire’ responses throughout or at different points in time during the course of the
pandemic. As we have already noted, grouping governments by response is per-
haps not a feasible thing to do. Most governments have changed strategic stance
several times both as a result of the epidemiological situation and due to swings in
political mood. Moreover, some governments have done this due to uncertainty
concerns, other due to health indicators on the ground, and yet others due to
political and economic concerns. In some countries, like Brazil and the United
States (US), there has also been notable variation between regional authorities and
their willingness to partake or resist national-level mandates. Other strategies have
involved (or at least contained as a component) an emphasis on ‘shielding’ and
protecting the vulnerable and at-risk populations, such as the elderly. Many
Western governments have also emphasized ‘focused’ strategies that aim to


























































































facilitate as much continuity as possible, through such tools as TTI, closing down
more periodically in response to a worsening epidemiological situation, and
opening more once certain positive thresholds are reached again (sometimes rad-
ical shifts between re-openings and closure also led to scandals). In such situations,
as well as other situations where control is lost (which makes e.g., TTI difficult),
more indiscriminate measures are often implemented, which I refer to here as
‘halting’ strategies. These include curfews, mobility regulations, work-from-home
declarations, closing down malls, pubs, restaurants and the like. Halting strategies
aim to brake the pandemic onset by lowering the number of people infected by
each infected individual through more-or-less universal contact reduction measures
and partial closedown of spaces where crowd control is impractical, as in the
popular discourse on ‘halting the spread of the virus’ or aiming to ‘flatten the
curve’. At the most intense end of the continuum, we find strategies I refer to here
as ‘suppressing’ strategies. These are sets of indiscriminate measures aimed at
lowering the basic reproduction number to a point where the spread disease is
effectively curbed, bringing the onset of outbreaks to a halt, going beyond ‘flat-
tening the curve’ towards bringing it ‘under control’, often after control has been
lost rendering focused approaches infeasible and halting strategies insufficient. In
the wake of vaccine rollout, these tendencies have largely continued. We can
observe that some countries open quickly in a more laissez faire manner after a
certain vaccine coverage was reached, whilst other countries continue with strin-
gent measures despite notable vaccination rates. Further, the very different rates at
which populations in different countries get vaccinated (either due to poor access
or scepticism) give rise to debates around whether vaccines can end the global
pandemic.
Pandemic response is often shaped to a significant extent by uncertainty
(Karlsen and Kruke 2018). Given the uncertainty decision-makers face, not only
due to the relatively long incubation period of the disease of up to two weeks, but
also because of the limited evidence base behind all the proposed sets of measures,
the feasibility of each of the measures listed here remains contested. Among the
factors often cited as consequential in the decision for an optimal approach are the
following: Dilemmas concerning financial impact on the economy, both over the
short-term and long-term; the choices of neighboring countries — giving rise not
only to political pressure domestically but also having a direct effect on the pos-
sible effectiveness of measures owing to the realization that ‘one cannot realisti-
cally win this battle alone’; and matters of human rights and principles of justice
(such as unnecessarily hindering freedom of movement and entrepreneurship after
which it is no longer necessary out of public health concern). The purpose of this



























































































underpinning them, as well as their potential societal and political implications.
Conceptually the paper engages with the wider pandemic response policy literature
(cf. Boin et al. 2020, 2021; Maor and Howlett 2020; Capano et al. 2020).
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 elaborates on the nature of each of
the potential ‘strategy narratives’ that countries have adopted (and have struggled
to decide between) in response to various ‘pandemic waves’ or ‘peaks’. Section 3
reflects on the stakes involved in the various strategy narratives, focusing partic-
ularly on the positive and negative arguments presented for each strategy, reflecting
particularly on the potential implications for current knowledge on the politics of
pandemic response and health emergencies as well as on the challenge faced by
developing countries. The final and concluding section presents a reflection on the
potential fallout from the pandemic with a particular focus on the question of how
the normative views that the pandemic created will linger and potentially set
precedent for future pandemic responses.
2. Anticipating the Imminent Peak and Potential for Catastrophe
In early 2020, the emerging COVID-19 pandemic triggered global reactions and
responses, as well as indifference in some instances. What was in early 2020
experienced by decision-makers as a highly uncertain time, the slow build-up of
the COVID-19 pandemic constituted a ‘fundamental challenge for the crisis
management capacities of the modern state’ (Capano et al. 2020). The pandemic
can best be conceptualized as a creeping disaster that struck the world by relative
surprise (Boin et al. 2020a), although, perhaps paradoxically, deadly pandemics
featured highly on decision maker’s lists of likely risks to society. Due to its onset
dynamics and the way it spreads, the pandemic is essentially a temporal phe-
nomenon both epidemiologically and in the way it is experienced socially (Werron
and Ringel 2020). To a large extent, this uncertainty was connected to the dreaded
arrival of ‘the peak’ or the ‘top of the curve (Figure 1). In most countries, the initial
‘peak’ was subsequently followed by new ‘waves’ months later.
Symbolism is recognized as an essential aspect of legitimizing emergency
measures (‘t Hart 1993). One can argue that visual representations of surge bed
capacity became the very symbol of the slowly emerging pandemic towards mid-
March 2020. Shortly after the WHO pandemic declaration, the narrative focus of
the crisis was fixed on ‘flattening the curve’, generating intense feelings of anxiety
for many as sentiments of collectively bracing for potential system collapse in-
tensified. The fear was that, if the measures were to prove insufficient, the curve
would end up becoming too steep with potentially catastrophic societal con-
sequences and we would not be able to tell in the present, only in the future, if


























































































society was on the right track. A major source of uncertainty was then finding the
right balance between safety and freedom so as to keep ‘the curve’ within the
carrying capacity of the systems. This feeling arguably intensified after Ferguson
et al. (2020) published their estimates of how bad it could get if measures proved
insufficient, triggering the implementation of measures in most countries with
varying degrees of strictness and socio-economic consequences.
Two other key texts that had a big effect on the experience of living in antic-
ipation of ‘the peak’ were Coronavirus: Why You Must Act Now and Coronavirus:
The Hammer and the Dance (Pueyo 2020a. 2020b), the latter also featuring centrally
in debates over which strategic stances to assume in the face of the emerging threat.
Although not published in scientific outlets, these articles were among the most shared
and liked articles on social media with over 60 million reads and were translated into
over 40 languages, including different versions of translations. Published just as
most European countries were implementing stringent measures, the publication of
Coronavirus: Why You Must Act Nowserved to establish a sense of urgency by
effectively visualizing the cost of inaction measured not in weeks or months, but
in days. Coronavirus: The Hammer and the Danceargued the case for swifter
implementation of strict measures to regain control by comparing the implemen-
tation of strict measures and more relaxed mitigative measures. This publication
also gave rise to further debates around types of responses, the paper itself dis-
tinguishing between inaction, mitigation and ‘the hammer’ as distinct approaches.
Later adaptions also referred to the work of Reason (1997) on ‘The Swiss Cheese
Model’, illustrating how measures should be seen as sets of measures that are most
effective in combination (Figure 2).
By mid-March 2019, most European news outlets were continuously commu-
nicating their published health strategic stance by way of reference to ‘the curve’ or



























































































‘peak’, which was estimated to arrive by late spring or early summer the same year,
with narratives centered on the crucial importance of slowing down or altogether
curbing the exponential graph. Indeed, major news outlets all over the world had
by this time begun updating infection graphs and death graphs day and night,
strengthening the sense of dread as life was increasingly dominated by anticipation
of the peak and uncertainty rose as to whether societies would be successful at
halting or curbing present trends. From a sociological viewpoint, Werron and
Ringel (2020: 59) argue that
Until the end of May, responsive practices in many countries and
with few exceptions were largely affirmative of the goal to fight
the virus by adhering to the standards promoted by a powerful
discourse coalition of politicians in public office, health officials
and scientists, journalists and other actors who enjoy the privilege
of being well-established “public orators.” By early to mid-June,
there were more and more signs of an increase in responsive
pandemic practices aiming to resist the dominant definition of the
situation — in some countries and/or regions more than in others.
The time-lag between the moment measures was implemented and the time at
which their effects would materialize in terms of declining graphs was significant,
about two weeks, furthering the sense of uncertainty at the initial stages of the
pandemic about whether societies were on the right course or headed for a colli-
sion. Although the ‘rudder’ had been turned, it was not certain we could get off
collision course, as it were. As part of the scramble to avoid the worst predictions
becoming reality, most governments thus formulated and revised their strategic
Figure 2. The ‘Swiss Cheese Model’ as used to Visualize COVID-19 Measures. The illustration,
which is based on the work of Reason (cf. 1997), aims to illustrate how each intervention (cheese
layer) has weaknesses (cheese holes). the metaphor thus illustrates how multiple layers or sets of
interventions improve safety and reduces risk (MacKay 2021)


























































































stance continuously as more data became available and also as a result of con-
tinuous shifts in public sentiment and the political climate, also generating some
controversy. It was commonly observed that one ‘mode of resistance is
“highlighting inconsistencies”, especially on the part of those who are in favor
of the dominant definition of the situation’ (ibid.). Resistance was often rooted
in different kinds of meta-narratives, ‘ranging from established political cleavages
(“we cannot trust party X”) and scepticism about science to full-blown
conspiracy theories such as “Bill Gates is trying to depopulate the world”’ (ibid.).
As uncertainties became to a greater extent embedded into everyday experience,
one could argue that the experience eventually resembled more one of enduring the
now obviously long onset of the pandemic (Honkasalo 2007). All of the above has
important implications not only for public health but also for how we may ap-
proach creeping crises as a topic of inquiry, as it increasingly becomes clear that
long onsets lasting many months drains public and leaders in what may be labeled
surprising ways. Thus, sentiments towards measures shift and affective states are
readily altered as conditions improve or worsen over time due to setbacks and a
release in the strictness of measures (Cairney and Wellstead 2020; Maor and
Howlett 2020), with implications also for crisis leadership and political pressure.
3. Kinds of Response Measures and Strategies Adopted
by Countries
Health authorities and governments vary widely with regards to their framing of
the COVID-19 threat and as to how the aims of selected strategies are presented to
the public. Whilst bearing in mind that the actual measures implemented may not
correspond to the way in which the stated goal of a particular strategy is framed
(e.g., stating that the goal is curbing whilst the measures implemented appear to not
be pursuing such ends in practice), the goal of this paper is not to assess the quality of
any given country’s measures but to provide an overview of kinds of strategies. As
stated in the introduction, the goal of this conceptual exercise is not necessarily to
establish an exhaustive typology of objective responses with mutually exclusive cat-
egories, but rather represents a reflection or elucidation effort concerning the notion of
choosing a particular strategic stance. Below is a rudimentary effort at teasing out
types of responses that covers most of the measures discussed later in this paper.
Laissez-faire narratives emphasize minimal or no intervention for various
reasons. While some countries may be implementing only a minimum of public
health measures in response to the COVID-19 threat, mainly due to a relative
inability to do so (for example, due to resource constraints or internal conflict) a



























































































priorities concerning the economy and livelihoods. Although few countries have
actively maintained such a stance throughout the duration of the pandemic, many
countries, including the US, Sweden, UK and Brazil were hesitant to adopt
stringent measures at the onset of the pandemic. However, it should also be
mentioned that in the case of both Brazil and the US, a considerable conflict
between national-level and local narratives was observed, with local decision
makers in many cases not reproducing the laissez-faire narratives of the national
government. Whilst this strategy only minimally disrupts livelihoods and business
over the short term, it eventually becomes clear that countries hesitant to adopt
measures at first later experience higher infection and death rates than countries
with more consistent strategies.
It is problematic to infer that any country maintained a laissez-faire attitude
throughout the duration of the pandemic. Yet it is clear that laissez-faire narratives
constitute a distinct kind of strategic stance that leaders have adopted at times, not only
at the initial onset. Indeed, some national leaders have also returned to laissez-
faire narratives after a period of implementing other, more stringent approaches, with
Trump and Bolsonaro perhaps being suitable examples. This demonstrates that these
kinds of strategies should not be understood as entirely categorical or mutually
exclusive.
Shielding and protecting approaches mainly aim to shield so-defined ‘at-risk
groups’ (e.g., the elderly and people with underlying health conditions) from as
much social contact as possible until the COVID-19 threat is brought under
control. The UK, among other countries, pursued such an approach initially as part
of a ‘herd immunity’ logic. This was later abandoned when reports, such as that of
Ferguson et al. (2020), suggested that the human death toll could be considerable.
The WHO has since questioned the basis of this strategy, particularly in light of its
reliance on imperfect information and estimation at this stage (Randolph and
Barreiro 2020). It could be assumed that both the Netherlands and Sweden initially
preferred a minimum intervention strategy which was since veering towards more
of a flexible stance, emphasizing voluntary and non-disruptive NPIs. However, all
countries for a time suspected that herd immunity was imminent later realized
through antibody tests that a smaller-than-expected share of the population had
been infected and thus immunity being lower than anticipated, again indicating that
mortality and morbidity was higher than initially assumed. It should also be
mentioned that few governments have explicitly indicated that herd immunity was
a goal or explicit strategic stance, it was more often than not a wished-for by-
product of minimalist intervention. It still remains a key part of the overall strategic
repertoire, indicated by such documents as the UKs guidance note on Guidance on
shielding and protecting people who are clinically extremely vulnerable from


























































































COVID-19 (UK Government 2020). The initial phase of the discourse surrounding
the pandemic in these countries was in many places focused on the at-risk groups,
meaning that the population at large could enjoy somewhat greater freedom given
that at-risk groups were ‘shielded’. In Norway, for example, press briefings with Prime
Minister Solberg and a speech delivered by King Harald V, emphasized the impor-
tance of shielding our vulnerable and elderly from the virus, initially framing the
strategic response in terms of a collective sacrifice to protect at-risk groups among us.
From a press briefing by the Norwegian minister of health, it was stated that
The measures will have a significant impact on the personal
freedom of our inhabitants. These are measures that directly shape
the daily lives of people and how our society functions. We are
doing this to halt an infection that poses little risk to the many, but
that may be very dangerous for some. We do this to shield those of
us who are most vulnerable (Government of Norway 2020b).
This rhetoric was later abandoned as deaths among non-risk groups were observed
and critique surrounding the observation that ‘you and I could also suffer hospi-
talization or death’ shifted the political climate. The interaction between political
rhetoric or shifts in the political landscape and the shifts in public sentiments is
complex. However, these narratives seem to have eventually become politically
problematic as many people who were not at risk also fear to suffer adverse
consequences should they catch the disease. In summary, shielding and protecting
may be considered one kind of narrative and strategic stance in the sense that it has
surfaced throughout, particularly at the beginning of the pandemic, based on clear
demographic patterns observed in mortality and morbidity data. Yet, variation in
the degree to which non-risk groups have feared infection has also shaped the
attractiveness (or lack thereof) of such rhetoric, indicating also that during creeping
crises, such as COVID-19, public sentiments periodically change as the day-to-day
lived experience of the pandemic changes.
Focused approaches have emphasized a minimum economic disruption logic
but with extensive testing and contact tracing in the population to allow for as
much normalcy as possible. It is necessary to declare at the onset that, for many
countries, a focused approach became impractical from an early stage due to an
initial lack of testing and control. The kind of strategic toolbox that we here label
‘focused’ relies on aggressive testing and intervening mainly in epidemiological
hotspots, in turn requiring sufficient overview to know, more or less, where in-
fection is happening at any given time. Not to be confused with a laissez-faire
stance, focused measures are extensive, costly and, some would say, intrusive as



























































































be recorded, lists of attendants must be archived and group sizes must be controlled
under a sort of regime aimed at ‘breaking the chain of infection’ wherever it is
observed to be breaking out. Using South Korea as an example, the government
has enacted laws that grant it authority to access CCTV footage, GPS data from
phones, bank transactions and other details of any person confirmed to have
COVID-19 (Parodi et al. 2020). South Korea, Hong Kong and Taiwan were fre-
quently brought forward as having pioneered this approach early on with an ex-
tensive apparatus engaged in contact tracing and a strong focus on high test
capacity. Other countries that may be said to have initially adopted a ‘hammer and
dance’ approach (Pueyo 2020b), had an opportunity to adopt a focused approach at
a later time in the pandemic onset after regaining their footing and carefully
releasing measures, only after test and trace capacities had been strengthened.
A focused approach necessarily hinges on continuous adjustment of the approach
as new data comes in, tightening control around hotspots while swiftly releasing
measures in locations where the infection is under control. Perhaps the main
difference between what we label a focused kind of strategy is that it, unlike a
halting or curbing approach, is as spatially focused as possible. In the absence of
control, the strategic stances of halting or curbing are built on an assumption that
every person is potentially positive, meaning that social interaction at large must be
greatly limited in a more universal and indiscriminate way. While recognizing that
the type is fuzzy at best, what we refer to as focused kinds of responses are those
sets of responses that aim to isolate and break chains of cases, minimizing the
degree to which the population as a whole are affected indiscriminately.
Halting, or prolonging as well as lessening the ‘peak’ of the pandemic to make
it somewhat less intense and to reduce strain on the healthcare system seems to be
the strategy that most countries pursued. The approach essentially involves an
admittance that containment or control is infeasible, and narratives instead center
on keeping infections rate within the carrying capacity of the health system (see
Figure 1). Centrally, the strategy involves reducing the number of contact points
between potentially infected people with the objective of reducing the basic re-
production number (or the number of people infected by each infected individual)
so as to ‘drag out’ the duration of the pandemic rather than entirely curb it. The
goal of this strategy is mainly to allow healthcare systems to increase their capacity
in anticipation of the expected surge in critically ill COVID-19 patients as well as
to distribute these across a longer temporal period. Halting kinds of response thus
emphasize reducing the intensity of local epidemics on the hand while aiming to
increase the resilience of the health system on the other (often expressed in public
communication in terms of ‘buying time’ or similar formulations). As mentioned in
the previous paragraph, efforts at halting the onset of the pandemic in most cases


























































































constitute an indiscriminate response as no particular populations are targeted.
Instead, a series of measures need to be aimed to reduce contacts and infection that
is implemented for whole communities with few exceptions. It also makes sense to
say that variants of surge bed capacity visualizations have become a defining
feature of the public imagination of the then-emerging pandemic and its dreaded
peak. Essentially introducing a dilemma of price of ‘cure’ vs. price of disease,
efforts at slowing down the peak open up for controversial debates surrounding
how stringent the measures should be, how much society can pay (both in eco-
nomic and social terms) for a mitigative effect, as well as what constitutes an
acceptable reproductive number, transmission rate and mortality.
While the duration of the desired prolongation is much debated due to the high
cost of the measures involved, the arguments underpinning this approach revolve
around the logic that, if such prolongation can avoid the peak being excessively
steep, a larger number of people (out of those affected by the illness during the
pandemic(s)) may receive intensive care. At the very beginning of the pandemic,
when high uncertainty was prevalent, decision makers also justified the need for
buying time on the grounds that this would indirectly also buy us more information
and reduced uncertainty. Conversely, then, the shorter the onset period, the larger
the surge — meaning that capacity will be exhausted sooner and to a greater
degree, leading to a greater human toll due to exploded capacity in intensive care
units. This is the central idea communicated by visual representations of surge bed
capacity, such as Figure 1.
Suppressing measures aim to restrict the transmission rate of the disease so as
to eventually bring a local or national outbreak under control (and potentially end
it, as New Zealand set out to do). In practice, because this approach requires a vast
amount of resources and capacity (e.g., for curfews, contact tracing, testing and
quarantines, depending on the lack of control initially), few societies have had the
political will to pursue such stringent measures over time, and where they have
been used they have often been limited geographically to key epicenters. While
recognizing that the various measures represented here may overlap, in the sense
that a deceleration strategy may require periods of suppress measures to gain
control of exponential reproduction rates, maintaining ‘suppress measures’ is ar-
guably too costly and socio-politically problematic for most governments to pursue
them for prolonged periods of time. Argentina is one example of a country that
pursued such an approach, maintaining lockdown for a considerable period of
time. Furthermore, critics of stringent suppressing measures have challenged such
methods, arguing that reoccurrences are likely and that keeping COVID-19 cases
at near-zero levels for a period of uncertain duration is in many ways politically



























































































many countries. The local resistance against measures also show the contentious
nature of balancing safety vs. freedom dilemmas. However, due to the potential for
saving many lives, proponents of such measures have in turn critiqued govern-
ments for not having strived to implement strategies aiming at curbing the pan-
demic at an early stage, but often at a great cost for mental health and the working
poor, particularly in countries with large informal economies and weak social nets.
4. Discussion: Navigating Dilemmas, Contradictions, Paradoxes and
Drawing Lessons for Effective Pandemic Response in the Future
The type of pandemic response pursued may be attributable due to a myriad of
considerations and uncertainties. The ideological disposition of the ruling party’s
leadership, composition of its structural governmental institutions, robustness of its
economy and responsive resources can all help shape or alter the course of selected
strategies. Success is also hard to gauge, whether it is measured with regards to the
mitigation of the overall death toll, negative economic impact or perhaps even
pursuit of that which is least socially intrusive, thus these strategies are often
adopted as a means towards the achievement of an overarching aim. Indeed,
countries and sub-populations have varied significantly in what they consider to be
an appropriate yardstick of success. Temporal considerations as to whether the
strategy is intended to have a long or short-term impact may also factor in the
assessment of its success, and perceptions of what comprises a successful strategy
are likely to also contrast between the major beneficiaries and losers within, re-
spectively, affected demographical groups. It is not clear whether necessarily the
strictest responses are the best, just as it is not clear whether the most relaxed
measures are ethical if the death toll is far higher as a result. As sentiments towards
measured shift and affective states are altered, policymakers thus require an ap-
proach that provides clarity and robustness in order for a response to be imple-
mented effectively whilst simultaneously needing to be proactive and flexible due
to the continuously shifting epidemiological and affective landscape. Indeed, an
interesting aspect of the response to this pandemic has been the importance of the
latter for the former.
Public sentimentality may go some way as to dictating what may become
considered ‘best practice’ for future pandemic response, at least in a given political
context. The New Zealand premier, Jacinda Ardern, swept to victory in the 2020
election with the largest swing to an incumbent government in the country’s his-
tory and the ability to form the first single-party majority government since 1993
(van Veen 2020). This being partially attributed to the acclaimed handling of the


























































































pandemic response in which one of the world’s strictest lockdowns during March–
April 2020 resulted in a death toll of 25 and less than 2,000 confirmed cases
amongst a population of 5 million. On the other hand, the US president Donald
Trump saw approval ratings plummet during the COVID-19 crisis on the back of a
stuttering economy, as well as the highest number of total cases and deaths of any
nation to date (Johns Hopkins University 2020). This may well have been a central
reason for the election of Joe Biden as the 46th president of the US, although
COVID-19 is not necessarily the only salient issue in the minds of citizens. It is
clear that divisions over how to face the pandemic are not easily overcome. Pro-
tests have arisen in many countries in a worldwide in backlash against the cur-
tailment of civil liberties and the prospect of enforcement by governments with
regards to the wearing of masks, curfews and social distancing restrictions. Sweden
is also cited as having observed a staggering number of deaths relative to its Nordic
neighbors, but with less of a political backlash. The majority of Nordic countries
narratives centered on their favoring of less interventionist approach, using only as
many restrictions and as much enforcement as ‘necessary’ at any given time.
Sweden was also been hailed at attempting to draw on voluntary measures and
minimal intrusion (Thomas 2020), although their strategic stance became scan-
dalized later on. Other commentators have labeled the ‘Swedish model’, relying on
a laissez-faire approach, at least comparatively, as ‘a disaster’ (Bjorklund and
Ewing 2020). Norway in essence followed a similar ‘focused’ approach whenever
and wherever the epidemiological situation allowed for it, although with border
control (Sweden did not close borders). But in essence bars serving food as well as
restaurants have essentially remained open (with social distancing measures)
throughout the pandemic in that country, with masks only having being mandatory
in Oslo and Bergen (Norway’s largest cities), and only for shorter periods of time
when the epidemiological situation was seen as sufficiently severe to justify their
mandatory use. Thus, the lens through which success is viewed could also rest
upon the weight given to civil liberties vs. the costs of non-interventionist strate-
gies. Discussions of best practice and pandemic response precedence are likely to
reflect these tensions.
There is also the suggestion that certain governments may have sought an
opportunistic response in order to consolidate or strengthen their position and
assume greater authority, thus the chosen strategy may not seek to succeed in the
more conventional sense of damage limitation. Indications of a negative change in
the quality of global democracy and human rights since the onset of the pandemic
are also coupled with disruptions to electoral processes in many countries (The
Economist 2020). Public pressures may sway decision making, whilst measures



























































































lockdown and hygiene practices may test societal adherence and resilience. En-
forcement of stringent social regulations and control could also bring into question
the role of the state with regards to the duty of care over the general population and
limits to civil liberties and freedoms. In authoritarian regimes, the pandemic may
allow leaders to foresee any destabilizing consequences that a response may have
with regards to preservation of power and also any opportunities it may present to
extend this.
The difficulty of having to act upon imperfect information also presents a
significant obstacle for the selection of the optimal strategy. Moreover, the pre-
sentation of strategy has to be actively framed and the frame has to work in terms
of public acceptance (Boin et al. 2009). This became particularly evident during
the spring of 2020, when reliable information both about the virus itself and the
effects of measures were unclear. Fenz and Kharas (2020) state that it is hard to
estimate the impact of COVID-19 due to many uncertainties and large indirect
ramifications from resultant policy responses. Policymakers have to contend with
the need to consider advice from those with scientific and political expertize and
implement this into a practical and palatable response. The effects of the indirect
and unintended ramifications of policy responses can result in a number of un-
anticipated consequences. The ability of a society to maintain vital functions in the
face of pandemics is dependent on successful interactions between a wide series of
participants, components and processes. Sound decision-making within these
settings places a major emphasis on understanding the current state and developing
trends at an early point of time (Wolf 2020). Thus, lessons from the COVID-19
pandemic should help with regards to anticipation for future pandemic response
and allow for more decisive action. The result should be that a subsequent pan-
demic is less likely to catch the world ‘off-guard’ and better anticipate the flow and
ebb of how a virus might spread and as to when it may reach its peak. The
importance of motivation and fatigue in the population should also feature more
prominently in pandemic plans and communication strategies. Whilst it is too early
to tell the long-term consequences of policy responses to COVID-19, drastic
measures are likely to bring about a variety of alterations to socio-economic
systems and unexpected secondary and tertiary effects. It is reasonable to expect
that these effects and perturbations are going to be the topic for social research for
some time.
Political considerations may also clash with the advice and guidance afforded
by experts. In democratic societies, this can bring into focus the role of non-elected
experts and bureaucrats as well as their relationship to those elected officials
currently holding office. For example, Sweden’s approach, built upon advice from
the state epidemiologist, is subject to a government appointed commission to


























































































investigate the appropriateness of the strategy due to excessive deaths
(Milne 2020). One could argue that it is unclear whether the Swedes are pursuing a
focused approach (that initially failed) or a laissez-faire approach. The UK gov-
ernment’s response to the pandemic has brought much scrutiny as to whether
expert advice has been adhered to as well as the levels of transparency in the
decision-making process (Landler and Castle 2020; Grey and MacAskill 2020).
The UK response has also been shaped by a frequent change in response type,
ranging from shielding to focus to suppressing measures, repeatedly showing a
tendency to underestimate the persistence of the pandemic. It also seems clear that
where governance contradictions have been observed, such as in federal systems,
local decision makers have often played a pivotal role where national leaders have
assumed a more laid back role. In Brazil, for example, contradictions between
national-level and lower levels of governance have forced local leaders and
other sectors of government to step up despite a fragmented national leadership
(Barberia and Gómez 2020).
The spread of the virus has been rapid, and thus governments have been forced
to act decisively despite this information deficit. This is an uncomfortable situation
to be in as due to the severity of the measures required — and their significant
impact and consequence — a precautionary approach would normally be favored
in decisions of such magnitude. However, the fallout from a failure to act deci-
sively and effectively is likely to have had a devastating impact on both human
health and the economy. None of the aforementioned strategic responses are de-
void of negative repercussions. The political landscape in many countries is likely
to remain affected in the long term due to the COVID-19 pandemic, thus future
pandemic response may draw upon the adoption of strategies that are most ad-
vantageous for policy makers with regards to public perceptions of performance
(particularly in the case of democratic regimes) or responses that prove least
disruptive with regards to negative implications for socioeconomic systems.
Till then, the stories that emerge and gain hold now are likely to shape the
questions of precedent that will follow in the pandemic aftermath as we enter
endemic phases.
5. Concluding Remarks
Which kinds of strategies adopted during the COVID-19 pandemic will be
highlighted as best practice remains to be seen at the time of writing, but no doubt
there will be lessons drawn in addition to the added benefit of hindsight in
assessing the long-term impacts and repercussions from the measures taken. It is



























































































where, depending on prevailing political maneuvering space, culture, trust and
other factors. Whether we will learn remains to be seen (Eriksson et al. 2021; Boin
et al. 2021). Policymakers will be able to assess the fallout from response strat-
egies, whilst also gaining a greater understanding for future pandemic preparedness
and awareness. The robustness of systems and institutions will have also been tested,
which therefore provides opportunities for refinement and alteration whereby
shortcomings have been exposed. It seems as though economic uncertainty stems
more from uncertain policy response to the virus than from the virus itself, so
decisiveness can be seen as key in order to mitigate the initial spread of a virus and
economic repercussions, in addition to bolstering confidence amongst the populace.
Not only do imminent threats themselves impact decision making and public
sentiment, but also the very anticipation of their onset. Analyzing how sentiment is
affected in this manner can also enhance capabilities for understanding the sub-
sequent reactionary measures and motivations. Thus, socioeconomic systems
tend to realign themselves in accordance with top-down governmental decision
making, which in turn is often influenced by public sentimentality. With the
COVID-19 pandemic, many countries around the world were bracing themselves
for its imminent impact on the basis of imperfect knowledge. Meso- and macro-
level interactions help shape the trajectory for a subsequent strategic approach, and
thus the need to keep the curve within system capabilities became the subject
of intense scrutiny.
The need to flatten the curve became paramount to many prior to widespread
infection rates in order to stop the anticipated trajectory that could have the po-
tential to overwhelm socioeconomic systems, particularly with regards to inter-
linkages between the economy and public health. ‘Suppression measures’ not only
entail a large economic cost, but often run the risk of encouraging upon civil
liberties such as freedom of assembly or the right to privacy. ‘Halting measures’
flatten the curve with regards to the number of new cases of infection, but also
steepen the recession curve that can exacerbate the negative economic impact. The
balance is not an easy one to strike, particularly when the anticipation is one of
dread due to a vast array of unknowns and potential pathways. Life in anticipation
is one of unease, both amongst the populace and decision makers, requiring action
in the present not based on present conditions but due to expected future, unde-
sirable conditions. The time lag between the present action and observable out-
comes is a considerable source of uncertainty for decision makers giving rise to
frequent changes in strategic stances as new information comes in and the political
realities change.
This paper sets out to reflect on kinds and variations of responses to the on-
going COVID-19 pandemic. In reflecting on how decision makers anticipated the


























































































spread of the virus and sought to ‘flatten the curve’, we argue that the kinds of
responses may be labeled (crudely) as falling into one of the following categories:
(1) laissez-faire, (2) shielding and protecting, (3) focused, (4) halting and
(5) suppressing. Decision makers have also varied between these, sometimes as a
result of uncertainty or changes in epidemiological context, but other times
also because of more scandalous management, forcing a change in approach. It
should also be noted that many of these are used in combination. For example,
suppressing strategies aimed at bringing an out-of-control situation into control are
often only necessary for a time, until focused measures can be re-instated in
combination with a shielding approach. Striking an optimal balance between in-
dividual liberties and epidemiological outcomes in light of ‘the curve’ remains a
controversial and value-laden issue. Discussions of response precedent and best
practices following the pandemic are likely to feature highly in lesson debates. In
either case, it seems clear that electorates and sub-populations within countries
struggle to agree on the optimal kind of response, as demonstrated by recent
demonstrations towards what is perceived as unnecessarily strict responses. Sim-
ilarly, laissez-faire responses have also been met by resistance by many. The role of
fear, dread and other affective states in the populace may also not be ignored by
pandemic planners, as a balance between mental health and compliance must also
be maintained. Ultimately, only time will tell what kinds of responses (and in what
mix and dosage) will go down in textbooks as optimal responses to similar future
pandemics. Further research will be needed to strengthen the knowledge on how
normative priorities and contradictions between kinds of strategies should better be
balanced and prioritized.
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